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THE  UNITED STATES IS CURRENTLY EXPERIENCING its worst  inflation  since 
the outbreak  of the Korean  war  in 1950.  In the first  four months  of 1973, 
consumer  prices  have  risen  at an annual  rate of 8.5 percent  and wholesale 
prices  have  increased  at a phenomenal  19  percent  rate.  The acceleration  of 
the inflation  has resulted  in sharp  criticism  of the administration's  anti- 
inflationary  policy. But the critics  have not rallied  around  a single  policy 
alternative.  Many  have  advocated  a return  to more  stringent  controls  from 
the relaxed  controls  of Phase  III, which  started  in January  1973.  Proposals 
vary  from  modified  versions  of Phase  II to a general  freeze  on all wages  and 
prices.  In its two most notable  actions  since  the start  of Phase  III, the ad- 
ministration  froze  retail  prices  of most  meats  in April,  and  in May  instituted 
prenotification  requirements  for price  increases  by the largest  firms-firms 
with earned  sales over $250 million-if  such increases  raise the average 
price  of all products  sold by the firm  by more than 1.5 percent  over the 
authorized  levels  prevailing  at the end of Phase  II. At the other  extreme, 
some critics  have attempted  to blame  all of the nation's  problems  on the 
controls  themselves.  They  have advocated  an end to all direct  attempts  to 
restrain  prices  and  wages.  As an alternative  they  propose  a more  restrictive 
monetary  and fiscal  policy, controlling  inflation  by maintaining  a larger 
margin  of unemployed  workers  and idle capacity. 
This note examines  several  characteristics  of the current  inflation  that 
differentiate  it from  the inflation  that existed  prior  to the freeze  of August 
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1971. The inflation of early 1973 reflects several forces: supply shortages in 
agriculture and a few other basic material industries; the effects of the 
second U.S.  devaluation; a bubble of price increases in some  industries, 
such as lumber, which had been held down by Phase II controls; and what 
appears to be some speculative increases in industrial prices in anticipation 
of renewed, stronger, controls. 
Many of the problems faced during Phase III would have been problems 
under a Phase II system. Phase II had no solution to rising food costs, and 
its response to industries where shortages existed (such as lumber, food, 
cement, fuels) did risk distortions. But the widespread interpretation of 
Phase III as a signal of an end to controls multiplied price increases in 
early 1973. The major task faced by current policy is to find a way to pre- 
vent the spread of rising food prices into wages and prices in the industrial 
sector and thus to avoid a return to the institutionalized upward spiral of 
wages and prices that operated during 1969-71. 
A Review of Recent Price and Wage Patterns 
In?the  latter months of 1972, it appeared that the Phase II program had 
been quite successful. As Table 1 shows, the administration's target of re- 
ducing the inflation to a 21/2  percent annual rate by year-end was basically 
realized in the nonfood sectors. In the fourth quarter  the nonfood items of 
the consumer price index (CPI) increased at a 21/2  percent annual rate, the 
industrials component of the wholesale price index (WPI) rose at a 2 per- 
cent rate, and the private nonfarm deflator (fixed weights) increased at a 2.6 
percent rate. 
Food prices rose far more rapidly over the latter months of Phase II, so 
that the overall target was not realized. But the problems in this area re- 
flected errors in other policy decisions and were not of the type toward 
which controls should be directed. The forces behind the rising food prices 
will be discussed in a later section. 
Wage rate increases slowed significantly in Phase II, from a 71/2  percent 
rate prior to controls to a rate slightly above 5 percent in the middle of 
Phase II, as shown in Table 2. The fourth-quarter  data showed some signs 
of acceleration but many of the effects appeared to be transitory. A new 
year for the pay controls began in November and resulted in the concentra- 
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Table 1. Rates of Change  in Selected Price Series, Various  Periods, 1969-73 
Seasonally  adjusted  annual  rate in percent 
December  March  September  December 
1970-  1972-  1972-  1972- 
August  December December  March 
Index  or deflator  1969-70  1971  1972  1972  1973 
Consumer  price index 
AU  items  5.9  3.8  3.4  3.2  8.8 
Food  5.5  5.0  3.5  5.2  29.8 
Nonfood itemsa,b  5.9  5.0  3.4  2.5  3.2 
Commoditiesa  4.2  3.1  3.4  1.0  3.4 
Allservicesbc  7.9  7.2  3.1  3.9  3.6 
Rento  4.1  4.3  3.2  3.7  5.4 
Medical  care  7.1  7.1  2.8  7.1  2.9 
Wholesale  price index 
All items  3.7  5.2  5.8  9.6  21.5 
Farm products,  processed 
foods, and feeds  3.4  6.5  10.9  30.1  53.1 
Industrial  commodities  3.8  4.7  4.1  2.0  10.3 
Consumer  finished  goods  3.0  2.2  3.0  -0.4  7.2 
Producer  finished  goods  4.7  3.6  2.5  -1.6  5.4 
Intermediate  materialsd  3.6  6.5  4.7  3.7  14.6 
Crude  materialse  7.4  3.3  7.5  14.6  11.8 
Private  nonfarm  deflatorf 
(fixed  weights)  4.9  4.8  2.1  2.6  5.6 
Sources: Price indexes-consumer  and wholesale price index series of the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. 
Nonfarm deflator data are based on authors' estimates and on fixed-weight deflators published in Survey  of 
Current  Business, Vols. 51 and 52 (August 1971 and August 1972), p. 25 and pp. 34-35, respectively. 
a.  Adjusted for repeal of auto excise tax. 
b.  Excludes mortgage interest. 
c.  No significant seasonal variation present. 
d. Excludes manufactured  foods and feedstuffs. 
e.  Excludes crude foodstuffs and feedstuffs. 
f.  Calculated from quarterly  data for the quarters  in which the months listed in the column headings  fall. 
sector  several  large  deferred  wage increases  took effect  during  the quarter 
and the rise in food prices  triggered  many  cost-of-living  escalator  clauses. 
Newly  negotiated  union  increases  declined  steadily  throughout  the  year  to a 
6.2 percent  first-year  increase  for contracts  concluded  in the fourth  quarter. 
This  was  far  below  the 10  to 12  percent  range  of first-year  increases  negoti- 
ated in 1970  and 1971. 
In the first  quarter  of 1973,  retail  food prices  exploded  to a 30 percent 
annual  rate  of increase  and  wholesale  prices  of farm  products  and  processed 
foods and feeds rose at a 53 percent  annual  rate. But the problems  went 
beyond  food as increases  in the nonfood  items of the CPI rose from a 2.5 266  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1973 
percent rate in the fourth quarter  to a 3.2 percent rate. Industrials rose at a 
10.3 percent rate from the very low 2.0 percent rate of the fourth quarter. 
Nearly all of the major categories of the CPI and WPI accelerated sharply. 
Several transitory factors contributed to the first-quarter  results. First, 
the second U.S.  dollar devaluation had a substantial impact on  several 
major components of the price indexes. The effective average devaluation 
against other major currencies is estimated to be between 6 and 7 percent, 
bringing the total devaluation since August 1971 to about 17 percent. The 
impact of the second round is a partial explanation of the 9.3 percent rise in 
the price index for nonferrous metals that occurred between December 
1972 and March 1973. These increases are concentrated in metals, other 
than aluminum, of which the United States imports a substantial portion of 
its consumption. In addition to the pure effects of devaluation, prices of 
many imported goods have been driven up by commodity speculation by 
the Japanese and others in anticipation of a U.S.  devaluation and a Jap- 
Table 2.  Rates of Change  in Selected Wage and Productivity  Series, 
Various Periods, 1969-73 
Seasonally  adjusted  annual  rate in percent 
1970:4-  1972:1-  1972:3-  1972:4- 
Sector anid  series  1969-70  1971:2  1972:3  1972:4  1973:1 
Private nonfarm sectora 
Employee  compensation  per 
manhour  7.1  7.4  5.3  7.2  10.7 
Excluding  payroll  tax 
increase  ...  ...  ...  ...  7.3 
Output  per manhour  0.6  4.8  5.5  3.0  3.8 
Unit labor cost  6.5  2.5  -0.2  4.1  6.5 
Average  hourly  earningsa  6.7  7.7  5.1  7.5  4.8 
Negotiated  wage chanigesb 
Total benefits  over life of 
contract  9.1  8.4  7.3  6.3  5.5 
First-year  adjustments,  all 
industries  11.9  10.1  6.8  6.2  5.3 
Manufacturing  8.1  8.7  6.8  6.4  6.5 
Contract  construction  17.6  13.4  6.2  4.7  4.5 
Sources: U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Current  Wage  Developments,  Vol. 25 (February 1973), Tables 1, 
7, and 8; BLS, News Release, "The Employment Situation: March 1973" (April 6, 1973), Table B-4; BLS, 
"Major Collective Bargaining Settlements, First Quarter 1973" (April 27, 1973; processed), Table 1, and 
unpublished BLS data. 
a.  Data are for nonsupervisory employees and are adjusted for interindustry  shifts and for overtime in 
manufacturing. 
b.  Average during the period; 1972:1-1972:3  uses an average of data for 1972:2 and 1972:3. Data on 
life of contract refer to units of more than 5,000 employees. First-year adjustments are for units of more 
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anese appreciation. Such activity was concentrated in the futures markets 
for commodities, including wool, cotton, rubber, and nonferrous metals. 
The impact of devaluation on the domestic market is heavier in 1973  than 
it was in  1971 for several reasons. In 1971 many of the major industrial 
countries were experiencing mild recessions and consequent reductions in 
demand and prices for the raw materials that the United States imports. 
But in  1973 world prices of these commodities were generally stable or 
rising. Importers of more finished products absorbed a major portion of 
the devaluation effect in 1971, but passed it forward in 1973. Also, domestic 
competitors of imported goods were free to raise their prices in 1973 unlike 
1971, which may have permitted some sympathetic adjustment of domestic 
prices. Over the coming year continued substantial price increases for im- 
ported raw materials (other than petroleum) appear to be unlikely. In most 
cases world supply appears adequate for near-term needs. In addition, the 
release of U.S.  stockpiles of some basic materials will help contain price 
pressures. 
A second influence on the price indexes was the Price Commission's post- 
ponement of the increase for automobiles into the beginning of 1973. This 
action lowered the reported fourth-quarter index and raised that for the 
first quarter-particularly  for the seasonally adjusted data. Third, lumber 
prices, which had been held down by Phase II, rose at an annual rate of 59 
percent for the quarter ending in March. This rate will not continue in fu- 
ture months. A final transitory influence resulted from the spurt in rents 
following the removal of national controls. 
However, issues of more lasting concern are raised by price increases in 
manufacturing  industries that have not been seriously affected  by rising raw 
material prices and that cannot be accounted for by the special factors just 
cited. Examples of  such industries are metal containers, machinery and 
equipment, products involving man-made textiles, and paper products. It is 
the broad range of the price increases in recent months that raises the major 
questions with respect to the effectiveness of the Phase III controls. 
Data on wage increases in the first quarter  of 1973 trace a mixed pattern. 
The fixed-weight  wage index for private nonfarm workers rose at only a 4.8 
percent annual rate. New union contract settlements continued the down- 
ward trend begun under Phase II. But the first-quarter  data are dominated 
by the settlement in the rail industry. This was a second step of the 1971 
contract, with a focus on nonwage benefits, and thus may not be representa- 
tive of future agreements. 
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in the private nonfarm sector show an annual rate of increase above 101/2 
percent.  This rate is strongly influenced by the January 1 increase in payroll 
taxes; but, even after adjustment for this element, compensation per man- 
hour was up at a 7 to 7 1/2  percent rate. The first-quarter  discrepancy be- 
tween the two major wage series (compensation per manhour adjusted for 
the tax increase and the fixed-weight earnings index) is an unusually large 
21/2  percent. Part of this discrepancy  may reflect increased overtime and an 
employment shift toward high-wage industries, effects that are removed 
from the fixed-weight index, but it is not possible to reconcile them from 
available data. Splitting the difference  between the two measures, as a best 
guess, implies that wage rates are currently rising at about 6 percent per 
year. 
Food  Prices' 
Grocery store prices have dominated public discussions of the inflation 
problem for the last six months.  As shown in Table 3, consumer prices 
began to accelerate  in the last half of 1972 and reached a 36 percent annual 
rate of increase in the first  three months of 1973. Wholesale food prices rose 
at a 53 percent rate during the same period. These sharp rises reflect the 
coincidence in one year of several factors, each of which reduced food 
supplies available to U.S. consumers. 
In the area of grains the single dominant factor was the pronounced 3  1/2 
percent decline in world grain production in 1972 compared with an aver- 
age annual increase of 31/2 percent since 1961. The crop failures in the 
USSR were of greatest significance for the United States since wheat pur- 
chases by the USSR  raised projected U.S.  exports above  1,100 million 
bushels in 1973 compared with 632 million bushels in 1972. This amount 
represents a major portion of the estimated 1973 crop of  1,500 million 
bushels. Current exports together with domestic consumption will reduce 
carryover stocks to very low levels by midyear. 
1. The material  of this section relies  heavily  on "Summary:  The 1972-73 Food Price 
Spiral,"  A Joint  Economic  Committee  Staff  Study  prepared  in consultation  with Schnitt- 
ker Associates (April 3, 1973; processed); William C. Helming, "Statement  on Why 
Farm and Food Prices  Have Increased  During 1972-1973 and Price Outlook for Farm 
Commodities  and Food During the Balance  of 1973,"  before  the Joint Economic  Com- 
mittee on Consumer  Economics  (April 4, 1973; processed);  "Food Prices,"  A Report 
prepared  by the Cost of Living  Council  Committee  on Food (March  20,1973; processed). Barry Bosworth  269 
Table 3.  Rates of Change in Selected Consumer  and Wholesale Food 
Price Indexes, Various Periods, 1970-73 
Seasonally  adjusted  annual  rate in percent 
December December  June  December 
1970-  1971-  1972-  1972- 
December  June  December  March 
Index  1971  1972  1972  1973 
Consumer  price index 
Food at home  4.2  2.9  7.1  35.8 
Cereals  and bakery  products  2.0  1.1  2.5  10.8 
Meats, poultry,  and fish  4.6  9.7  11.1  74.8 
Dairy products  2.2  1.6  2.2  12.4 
Fruits and vegetables  12.5  -6.1  11.4  24.5 
Other  0.5  2.8  4.2  16.0 
Wholesale  price index 
Farm products,  processed  foods, and 
feeds  6.0  5.9  23.6  53.1 
Fruits and vegetables  13.5  -17.8  37.5  58.8 
Grains  -11.6  -4.7  119.4  -33.1 
Plant and animal  fibers  18.2  45.5  -5.0  143.3 
Soybeansa  5.0  30.1  49.7  376.6 
Meats, poultry,  and fish (processed)  15.4  9.4  16.2  98.2 
Sources: U.S.  Bureau of Labor Statistics, The Consumer  Price Index, and BLS,  Wholesale  Prices and 
Price Indexes, monthly issues for March 1973 and earlier  months. 
a.  Not seasonally adjusted. 
The most dramatic  price  increases  have been  in the area  of feed grains, 
particularly  soybeans.  These  prices  reflect  a long-run  inadequacy  of pro- 
tein sources  which  has kept  prices  at a high  level  in recent  years.  The  situa- 
tion became  critical  when  the Peruvian  fish  harvest  plummeted  in 1972,  for 
fishmeal  is the world's  richest  source  of protein  feed. Then,  in 1973,  Peru 
suspended  all  fishing  for  anchovies  until  at least  late  summer.  The  harvest  of 
other  world  sources  of protein  was also depressed  during  1972. 
Production  of soybeans  in the United States  has failed  to match  con- 
sumption  since 1968  and  carryover  stocks  are  practically  nonexistent.  This 
development  has  resulted  in part  from  the acreage  set-aside  provision  of the 
Agricultural  Act of 1970. Farmers  who raised  both corn and soybeans 
could set aside  land for the corn program,  but could use land previously 
allocated  to  soybeans for corn production.  Under this legislation  the 
farmer  can  plant  whatever  he wants  on the remaining  land.  Since  yields  per 
acre  have  risen  far  more  rapidly  for corn  than  for soybeans,  the planting  of 
corn is favored  unless  soybean  prices  continually  rise more rapidly  than 
corn  prices. 270  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1973 
Unlike grain prices, the rising domestic price for meat products results 
only indirectly from world market conditions. Meat prices have shown a 
general upward trend that has been accentuated by current supply prob- 
lems. Many government  spokesmen have stressed the role of rising demand 
during the current period. While of long-run significance, demand factors 
have been of relatively minor importance in early 1973. Wholesale meat 
prices, which rose at an annual rate of 3.8 percent between 1965 and 1970, 
have accelerated sharply in the last year. As shown in Table 4, total meat 
Table 4.  Selected Statistics on Production  of Various Agricultural 
Products, Various Periods, 1960-73 
Product  and status  Period 
Meats and  poultry  (inspected  Second 
slaughterings;  average  half 1971- 
annual rate of change  second 
in percenta)  1960-70  1970-71  1971- 2  half 1972 
Meats, total  3.4  4.7  -1.6  -1.4 
Beef and veal  4.9  1.1  4.1  5.5 
Pork  1.9  9.7  -8.8  -10.0 
Poultry  5.2  1.1  6.2  3.8 
Wheat (millions  of bushels, 
annual average)  1965-69b  1969-70c  1970-71c  1971-72c,  d  1972-73c,e 
Beginning carryover  626  817  885  731  863 
Production  1,426  1,443  1,351  1,618  1,545 
Total  supply'  2,054  2,263  2,237  2,350  2,409 
Domestic  disappearance  709  772  768  855  818 
Exports  705  606  738  632  1,150 
Ending carryover  640  885  731  863  441 
Feed  grainsg  (millions  of tons, 
marketing years)  1970  1971  1972d  1973d 
Beginning carryover  48.6  33.2  48.4  35.0 
Production  160.1  207.7  199.8 
Total  supplyf  209.1  241.4  248.5  ... 
Domestic  disappearance  155.2  165.7  180.1  ... 
Exports  20.7  27.3  33.4  ... 
Ending carryover  33.2  48.4  35.0  ... 
Sources: Survey  of Current  Business,  Vol. 53 (March 1973), pp. S27-28, and prior issues; John A. Schnitt- 
ker, "Changes Needed in Farm Legislation," in The Economics of Federal Subsidy  Programns, A Compen- 
dium of Papers Submitted to the Subcommittee on Priorities and Econonmy  in Government of the Joint 
Economic Committee, 93 Cong. 1 sess. (1973), Pt. 7, pp. 869-70. 
a.  Calculated from production data, by weight. 
b.  Average for the twelve months, July through June, in these years. 
c.  Twelve-month marketing  year, spanning the years indicated. 
d. Preliminary. 
e.  Forecast. 
f.  Includes imports. 
g. Includes corn, oats, barley, and grain sorghum. Barry Bosworth  271 
production actually declined 1.6 percent in 1972 compared with an annual 
growth of 3.4 percent from 1960 to 1970. Production in the first quarter of 
1973 is estimated to have been 8 to  10 percent below the fourth-quarter 
level. 
The supply shortages can be traced to an interaction between high feed 
costs  and cyclical lows  in cattle and hog  marketings. Since early 1970 
cattlemen have been holding back on marketings  in order to build up their 
herds. Hog production has only recently  begun to recover from the cutback 
in output in early 1972, which followed low prices of the previous year. 
Supplies of both cattle and hogs were adversely affected by fears of an ex- 
tensive corn blight in 1970, which encouraged marketings designed to beat 
higher feed prices. Facing high costs for feed grains, farmers  have had little 
incentive to  bring animals into  the feedlots. High feed costs  also limit 
the time spent in the lots  and reduce the amount of weight per animal 
slaughtered. 
Because of its shorter cycle, production of poultry is far more sensitive to 
feed prices than that of other meats. Poultry prices have tended to follow 
the upward trend of feed costs in recent months. Increases in other farm 
commodities primarily reflect the vagaries of weather. Cotton prices have 
been driven up by heavy foreign bidding for the current crop; but, unless 
the weather is very poor in the South, these prices should return to more 
normal levels over the next year. 
Until very recently, agricultural  policy served to aggravate the problem 
of short supply that characterizes today's food price problem. The 1973 
wheat program called for maximum acreage set-aside. Despite the massive 
wheat sale to the USSR, this decision was not reversed until January, well 
after the fall planting period. As late as December, Agriculture  Department 
policy called for a restrictive  feed grain program to hold corn production to 
1972 levels. This policy was revised in January and March so that perhaps 
the U.S. feed grain carryover  will not be further  reduced during the coming 
crop year. The meat shortage has been evident for several years; but policy 
changes to expand grazing land were delayed until January, when the ad- 
ministration permitted the use of set-aside acreage for grazing and hog 
production. 
The outlook for farm prices over the next year remains very uncertain. 
Most major grain-producing  countries have scheduled substantially higher 
goals for farm production. However, weather conditions have remained 
poor in many parts of the world. U.S. grain reserves  have been reduced to 272  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1973 
minimal levels; stocks held by the Commodity Credit Corporation were 
sold and federal grain loans were recalled. The elimination of reserve  stocks 
means that any repetition of  serious crop failures would be disastrous. 
However, it is too  early for agricultural experts to  form any confident 
forecasts of this year's grain production. 
The Cost of Living Council (CLC) forecasts some improvement in food 
supplies late in 1973. The annual survey of planting intentions by the U.S. 
Department of Agriculture showed a 6 percent increase in acreage devoted 
to feed grains and wheat. The current outlook for the wheat crop is very 
good, with expectations for a 10 to 15 percent increase in wheat production 
over 1972; but a world shortage of rice implies continued high demand for 
wheat. Moreover, the weather  is beginning to reduce seriously the estimates 
of the corn crop. Spring  plowing completed in the Midwest was significantly 
behind rates of previous years. While this land may still be planted to soy- 
beans, relief for the feed grains market will be delayed. In addition, Peru re- 
cently suspended all fishing for anchovies until August or September. 
In the first part of 1973 the number of cattle on feed was 8 percent above 
levels of early 1972 and the pig crop for the December-to-May period was 7 
percent larger than in 1972. Even so, overall meat supplies for current con- 
sumption are forecast to rise only 2 percent during 1973 as farmers rebuild 
their stocks. High costs of feed grains could begin to hold hog supplies be- 
low the forecasts. Cattle cannot be easily held back from the market in the 
short run; but, given the freeze on meat prices, high feed grain prices will be 
passed back to  cattle producers, and may reduce planned expansion of 
herds. Poultry and egg production is also certain to be curtailed. 
It appears that 1973 will be a very high risk year for farm production. 
Since carryover stocks are so  very low,  poor weather could send grain 
prices above present levels, though good growing weather  could bring them 
back down toward historically more normal levels. Meat supplies will re- 
main very tight throughout the year, and substantial  increases  in supply will 
not be forthcoming until 1974. Fruit and vegetable prices, currently  at high 
levels, are extremely dependent on future weather conditions.  Consumer 
food prices rose sharply during the spring months, and will continue up- 
ward throughout the year. 
Lumber  Prices 
The problem of rising lumber prices did not originate with Phase III. It 
was one of the dominant concerns during Phase II. The rise began with the Barry Bosworth  273 
recovery of homebuilding in 1970: Lumber and wood prices advanced 21 
percent during the -eight months of 1971 prior to controls, 11 percent be- 
tween August 1971 and the end of  1972, and a further 21 percent in the 
first four months of 1973. 
The major source of this spectacular  rise in prices is obvious in the 73 per- 
cent expansion in homebuilding  between the second quarter  of 1970 and the 
fourth quarter  of 1972. This single area of construction accounts for about 
one-half of total lumber consumption. The industry was unable to meet 
this heavy demand and the result was a classic case of excess demand bid- 
ding up prices. Because of the rapidity of these developments, neither ex- 
pansion of productive capacity nor substitution of other products by lum- 
ber consumers could be mobilized to moderate the effects on prices. 
In understanding the current supply shortage it is important to distin- 
guish between the short-run and long-run problems that the industry faces. 
At present the major limit to production is sawmill capacity rather than a 
physical shortage of logs. This problem has been accentuated by the roller 
coaster nature of monetary policy over the last half decade. The collapse of 
homebuilding associated with the severe monetary restraint of  1966 and 
1969 sharply reduced lumber prices, driving the smaller independent saw- 
mills out of the industry  and restricting  the expansion of the larger firms.  As 
a result the industry's capacity today is only slightly above the levels of 
1966. 
Foreign trade has on balance provided a strong stabilizing influence on 
domestic prices. As shown in Table 5, imports of 9.4 billion board feet in 
1972 were of substantial importance in terms of both their absolute levels 
and their sensitivity to domestic prices. Given the reliance on imports, it is 
not feasible to shut the United States off from world lumber markets by 
export controls in an attempt to restrain prices, since lower U.S.  prices 
would redirect Canadian exports toward other countries. Exports of logs 
to Japan are a relatively  unimportant factor in the current  lumber shortage. 
Even if they were terminated, the sawmills in the Northwest, already op- 
erating at capacity, would be unable to increase production significantly. 
However, the entrance of Japanese buyers into the U.S.  market for logs 
does have greater long-run significance. It has permanently increased the 
price of logs and thus put the future costs to sawmill operators on a higher 
plateau. 
The declining level of lumber sales from federal lands has frequently 
been cited as a source of rising lumber prices. As Table 5 indicates, the 
harvest from these lands represents  about one-fourth of current  production. 274  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1973 
Table 5.  Selected Statistics on the Lumber  Industry, 1969-73 
Statistic  1969  1970  1971  1972  1973 
Wholesale  price  index  for  lumber 
and wood products 
(1967  -  100)  131.5  113.7  127.0  144.3  182.0a 
Billionis  of board  feet 
Production,  all types of 
lumber  35.8  34.5  36.7  38.7  ... 
Exports,  total sawmill 
products  1.2  1.3  1.1  1.4  ... 
Imports,  total sawmill 
products  6.3  6.1  7.6  9.4  ... 
Change  in inventory  stocks, 
end of period, total  0.4  1.0  -1.0  -1.2  ... 
Domestic  consumptionb  40.5  38.3  44.2  47.9  ... 
Log exports  2.1  2.5  2.0  3.1  ... 
Billions  of board  feet 
National  Forest  timber  sale 
program" 
Allowable  cut  11.5  11.5  11.5  11.6  11.  5d 
Sale of cutting rights  8.9  11.7  9.2  8.8  8.8d 
Actualcut  10.4  9.8  8.8  10.2  11.Od 
Sources: U.S.  Bureau of Labor Statistics, Wholesale  Prices and Price Inidexes  (March 1973), and prior 
issues; Survey of Current  Business,  Vol. 53 (March 1973) and prior issues, p. S31; National Forest Products 
Association tabulation, "National Forest Timber Sale Program: Allowable Harvest, Sell, and Harvest, 
Fiscal Years, 1965-1974" (April 1973; processed); and unpublished data from U.S. Forest Service. 
a.  April. 
b.  Domestic consumption equals production less exports plus imports less change in stocks. 
c.  Sawtimber only, fiscal year data. 
d.  Estimate. 
The reduction in timber sales is a joint  result of increased concern with 
environmental issues and a cutback in previous years of the budget of the 
U.S. Forest Service. This is not a major problem for the short term: Saw- 
mills are already operating at very high levels. However, in some areas of 
the country, excess sawmill capacity does exist and the log shortage has had 
some immediate impact. Efforts of the CLC to expand future timber sales 
may have some effect by encouraging holders of cutting rights on federal 
land to increase their current rates of harvesting. 
Other government  policies have contributed to the current  lumber prob- 
lem. The large wheat sale to the USSR in 1972 diverted railroad cars from 
delivering  lumber to domestic users, and thus caused lumber production to 
be curtailed in some areas as local storage facilities filled up. Second, the 
company-by-company approach to  price decisions utilized by the Price Barry Bosworth  275 
Commission during Phase II, together with the control of profit margins, 
threw the structure of market prices into chaos, and led some firms, con- 
strained by the profit ceiling, to cut production and hoard their logs on the 
stump until controls ended. 
The flexibility of lumber prices in previous cycles, together with the low 
degree of concentration in the industry, implies that lumber is basically a 
competitive industry. The current price increases reflect real underlying 
supply shortages with little hope of immediate relief. In such a situation di- 
rect price controls probably do more harm than good. With housing starts 
expected to decline during the rest of  1973, inflation of lumber prices is 
probably behind us; but in the absence of a drastic recession in homebuild- 
ing, any significant downward trend in prices during 1973 appears highly 
unlikely. 
Capacity  Pressures 
The rapid inflation of recent months together with a strong expansion of 
real demand has raised questions about how much industrial capacity is 
being strained and to what extent excess demand pressures  are appearing  in 
the economy. Some of the evidence on capacity utilization is briefly re- 
viewed in this section. 
The aggregate index of the Federal Reserve Board gives little indication 
of  serious pressure on  capacity. Capacity utilization in  manufacturing 
averaged 80.5 percent in the first  quarter  of 1973, substantially  above the 75 
percent rate for 1971 but far below the peaks of 91.9 and 87.7 percent re- 
ported for 1966 and 1968. Clearer evidence of capacity pressures can be 
found in the index for primary  process industries, which rose from a low of 
78 percent in the third quarter  of 1971 to 87.5 percent in the first quarter  of 
1973; this compares with peaks of 92.1 percent in 1966 and 88.5 percent in 
1968 and 1969. The utilization rate for advanced processing industries is a 
very low 76.8 percent compared with 92 percent in 1966. 
The capacity utilization indexes published by McGraw-Hill provide some 
additional industry detail and are shown in Table 6. Because of different 
methods of estimating capacity, the overall manufacturing  index has been 
moderately above that of the Federal Reserve index2 in recent years; but it 
2. See Board of Governors  of the Federal  Reserve System, Statistical  Release E.5, 
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Table 6.  Industrial  Operating  Rates, Selected Years, 1966-73 
Percent 
Feb-  Feb-  Feb-  Feb-  Feb- 
ruary  ruary  ruary  ruary  ruary 
Industry  1966  1968  1971  1972  1973 
Manufacturing  90.5  84.5  77.0  78.5  84.5 
Metalworking  industries  93.0  84.5  70.0  71.5  80.0 
Machinery  93.0  82.5  68.5  70.5  79.5 
Electrical  machinery  93.0  83.5  64.5  67.0  74.0 
Autos, trucks,  and parts  94.5  84.5  98.0  99.5  115.5 
Other  transportation  equipment  90.5  88.0  58.5  59.0  65.0 
Fabricated  metals  93.5  83.0  67.0  66.0  73.0 
Instruments  95.5  88.0  69.0  76.0  82.5 
Chemical  process  industries  89.5  85.0  80.5  83.5  88.0 
Chemicals  84.5  82.0  73.5  78.5  82.5 
Paper  93.0  88.5  92.0  93.5  96.5 
Rubber  96.5  96.5  92.5  95.0  106.0 
Stone, clay, and glass  84.5  76.5  72.5  76.0  76.0 
Petroleum  refining  93.0  95.0  92.5  88.5  95.5 
Nonferrous  metals  104.0  82.0  78.5  80.0  85.5 
Food and beverages  83.5  80.5  86.5  84.5  82.5 
Textiles  99.0  91.5  81.5  79.0  86.5 
Mininga  n.a.  82.5  90.0  77.0  77.0 
Utilities  n.a.  90.0  83.0  76.0  79.0 
All industries  n.a.  85.0  77.5  78.5  84.0 
Sources: McGraw-Hill Publications Company, Economics Department, tabulations, "Industrial Oper- 
ating Rates," and McGraw-Hill Economics Department, News Release, "Rising Operating Rate Suggests 
Boom in Capital Investment Is Here" (April 20, 1973). 
a.  Crude oil and natural gas extraction are excluded. 
n.a. Not available. 
is still far below its own 1966 level of 90.5 reported in Table 6. It is quite 
comparable  with the utilization rates of 1968 and early 1969. Signs of severe 
strain on capacity are restricted to  automobiles and certain nondurable 
goods industries-paper,  rubber, and petroleum refining. The high operat- 
ing rate in the automobile industry is not a serious inflationary factor as it 
does not reflect sharply rising marginal costs or rigid supply constraints. 
The Wharton index of capacity utilization for manufacturing, mining, 
and public utilities was at 94.2 percent in the first quarter of  1973.3 Al- 
though this index is sharply higher than the others, what matters is com- 
parisons with previous levels of the Wharton index itself. The current  index 
is still below the utilization rates of 96 percent and above recorded during 
the peak demand periods of 1966-69, but it has increased sharply from the 
3. Information  from Wharton  Forecasting  Associates,  Philadelphia. Barry Bosworth  277 
depressed levels of 1970-71. The Wharton index appears to be in greater 
agreement  with that of McGraw-Hill than with that of the Federal Reserve.4 
The capacity indexes are vulnerable to criticism because of problems of 
defining and measuring capacity. In some industries production methods 
imply that capacity rigidly limits supply and that more output can be forth- 
coming  only  at  sharply higher  costs.  In  industries whose  production 
methods are more flexible, higher operating rates do not result in shortages 
or higher marginal costs. Therefore we have attempted to obtain further 
evidence about operating rates in several  key industries through a survey of 
their trade associations. 
Significant  pressures on capacity are evident in industries such as lumber 
and cement, which have been supplying the boom in residential housing in 
recent years. But, as homebuilding begins to decline in 1973 in response to 
higher interest rates, the problems in these industries will begin to abate. 
The adjustment of lumber prices to  demand pressures has been largely 
completed. The problems in cement are concentrated in the Southeast and 
higher imports and shipments from other parts of the country have brought 
some relief. 
Paper, petroleum refining, and man-made fiber textiles are three non- 
durable industries whose operating rates, as reported by trade associations, 
are very high and likely to remain so in the future. The paper industry is 
subject to very rigid supply constraints and its operating rate of 97 percent 
is substantially above the 94.7 and 94.6 percent rates reached in previous 
cyclical peaks of 1966 and 1969. Petroleum refineries  are operating above 
90 percent of capacity, but pressures have been evident for several years. 
The problems in this area are more complex than simple excessive growth in 
aggregate demand. The pressures on the man-made fiber industry result 
more from rapid shifts in the composition of the demand for textiles than 
from a sudden acceleration of total demand. 
Excess capacity appears to be relatively plentiful in most of the durable 
goods industries. Although a published utilization index is not available for 
4. In part this discrepancy  reflects  the greater  emphasis  placed on the growth  of the 
capital  stock in constructing  the Federal  Reserve  index.  On this basis, estimated  capacity 
grew  more  rapidly  during  the 1968-69  investment  boom than  the other  measures  suggest. 
The Wharton index is based primarily  on extrapolation  of output growth between 
cyclical peaks  and thus gives  less direct  weight  to variations  in the growth  of the capital 
stock. The McGraw-Hill  index has as its benchmark  an end-of-year  survey  of operating 
rates reported  by major  firms. 278  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1973 
steel, the industry can hardly be under any general capacity pressures, since 
raw steel production in the first quarter was only 61/2  percent above the 
1969 level. Operating  rates in aluminum have recovered from the depressed 
levels of 1971 but are still substantially below the peaks of 1966 and 1969. 
The low levels of the ratio of unfilled orders to shipments for capital goods 
industries supports the impression given by the McGraw-Hill index that 
substantial unused capacity is available. Shipments of machine tools in the 
first quarter of 1973 were about 75 percent of 1968-69 levels. 
Transportation  is one industry in which capacity problems are severe and 
crucial to aggregate  economic activity. The huge movements of grain to the 
ports has created a serious boxcar shortage, which in turn has affected a 
long list of industries, including domestic food production, lumber, paper, 
textiles, and the  primary processing industries. The  situation has  been 
exacerbated by the inefficient operation of the rail industry in the East, 
where unused rail cars have tended to accumulate. Regulations of the Inter- 
state Commerce Commission have maintained very low rental rates for 
cars so that there is little incentive for a rapid turnaround. 
Most of the current concerns with capacity pressures  seem to arise more 
from the rate at which current production is rising than from difficulties 
associated with its absolute level. Some industries are experiencing trouble 
in expanding their utilization of existing capacity at a rate that matches the 
inflow of new orders. 
Policy 
No simple set of policy changes will extricate the United States from its 
current  inflation problem. There is a limit to the number of previous policy 
mistakes that can be overcome by current actions. Thus, with the benefit of 
hindsight, we can list some lessons learned from the last year. First, actions 
could and should have been taken early to meet the problems of rising food 
prices. Additional grazing land for beef cattle should have been made 
available several years ago when the beef shortage became obvious. The 
large one-shot sale of wheat to the USSR imposed serious domestic costs 
though it may have been an important element of foreign policy. Multi- 
year contracts for increased agricultural exports are very desirable but 
short-run agreements that  give production no  time to  respond can be 
problematic. In any case, the size of the export demand was known in Barry Bosworth  279 
August  1972 and production controls should have been relaxed then in- 
stead of waiting until January and March of 1973. 
The problem of rising lumber prices clearly demonstrates the dangers of 
allowing monetary policy and thus homebuilding to suffer such gyrations. 
Sudden and extreme fluctuations in demand are themselves inflationary in 
the long run. They seriously hamper rational planning of capacity expan- 
sion in industries with long lead times. 
The abandonment of Phase II for Phase III was carried out in a fashion 
that contributed to  the failure of  the controls program. Phase III was 
widely interpreted as a virtual end to controls, and thus spurred price in- 
creases in recent months. Nor is it evident that uncertainty  concerning gov- 
ernment actions itself contributes to price stability, as some government 
spokesmen maintain. Indeed, uncertainty is a powerful incentive to raise 
prices. 
What to do about current  policy is a far harder  question.  The economy cur- 
rently faces three major risks. First, the bad weather in the Midwest could 
continue, with serious damage to agricultural  production. The carryover of 
food supplies in the United States has been eliminated during the past crop 
year. If the United States or any other major food-supplying nation has a 
serious crop failure, the world food situation could become critical. Second, 
the sharp rise in food prices could be translated over the next two years into 
marked wage and price increases in the industrial sector and force a return 
to the type of wage-price spiral experienced in 1969-71. Third, the govern- 
ment could overreact  to the current  problem, adopt a very restrictive  mone- 
tary and fiscal policy, and turn the present expansion into a recession. 
Certainly, much in the first-quarter  price developments argues that the 
current intensification  of  inflation  is  transitory.  Devaluation,  lumber 
prices, and agricultural  prices explained a major part of the story. But price 
increases were not limited to these areas, and the peak in food prices is yet 
to come. The current outlook harbors many uncertainties; but, because the 
risks involved in assuming the worst are lower than those of hoping for the 
best, there are strong arguments for further government actions. 
FOOD PRICES 
In the area of farm production, little damage could be done by attempting 
to expand production to the maximum extent possible. Given the need to 
rebuild food inventories, prices cannot decline precipitately. In contrast to 280  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1973 
the costs of a major world food shortage, any risks of overproduction are 
minor and can be corrected. 
At present, federal production controls are no longer the limiting short- 
run factor in augmenting food supplies. The government will have to look 
beyond removing them for measures to correct the problem. I believe that 
several policy actions of increasing severity may be required. 
First, the problem of transportation  has become very serious. Corn cur- 
rently has a premium of 60 cents per bushel for delivery, and the margin for 
delivered wheat is about 47 cents. Substantial immediate gains could be 
realized from federal control of railroad cars or improvement in the eco- 
nomic  incentives for railcar utilization. Current government actions to 
relieve the transportation problem have been of little help. In addition, 
several farm communities have been under the threat of a fuel shortage 
during 1973 that the government could easily remove by guaranteeing the 
supply of fuel. 
Furthermore,  unless weather conditions improve soon, the United States 
may have to consider an embargo on feed grain exports. This move is cer- 
tainly not desirable in view of the long-run goal of expanding agricultural 
exports, but there is a limit to the burden that the United States would wish 
to place on the domestic economy. Little benefit inures to this country if 
foreign countries allow imports from the United States on a one-shot basis 
but then reimpose quotas after the crisis has passed. Farmers and con- 
sumers in the United States should not be forced to bear the brunt of ad- 
justment to crop fluctuations around the world. The nation has an interest 
in long-term trade arrangements, but not in deals that allow a one-time 
sale to dominate current exports. The embargo is less appropriate  for food 
grains since the wheat crop should be large and is a close substitute for rice, 
which is currently  in short world supply. The embargo could be effected by 
announcing that it will be applied if prices rise beyond a specific level. A 
preferable approach might be to  place quotas on  exports to  individual 
countries based on their purchases over recent years, in an attempt to main- 
tain supplies to countries that are willing to open their economies to U.S. 
agricultural  exports over the long term. 
Finally, direct controls may be required if food prices continue to rise. 
Current prices are high enough to ensure that farm production would not 
be adversely affected. The major problem with such controls is on the dis- 
tribution side. They are always a last resort but they may become necessary 
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increases  in the  industrial  sector,  and  a rapid  spreading  of the  inflation.  The 
nation may be forced to choose controls as the lesser evil. However, 
even they can work for short periods,  if they are carefully  and flexibly 
administered. 
Properly  approached,  controls  could  be a compromise  between  the cur- 
rent  interests  of farmers  and consumers.  The government  should  not seek 
to return  farm  prices  to former  levels  over  the  next  year,  the  goal  enunciated 
by some administration  officials.  Fears of future  price  declines,  fueled  by 
such  statements,  inhibit  the expansion  of farm  output,  particularly  of meat. 
Farmers  are legitimately  concerned  about a boom-bust  pattern  of farm 
prices  over  the next few years.  It would  be preferable  to aim  for a gradual 
and  controlled  decline  in farm  prices  from  current  levels,  with  the govern- 
ment  prepared  to buy up excess  supplies  if they should  develop.  Farmers 
did not cause  the current  crisis  and some guarantee  of stability  in future 
prices  could expand  current  production. 
The current  predicament  amply  demonstrates  the long-run  need to re- 
form  the general  farm  program.  The  solution  to the  problem  of low-income 
farmers  lies in treating  them as part of the overall  problem  of poverty 
rather  than  as beneficiaries  of production  controls  and  price  supports.  The 
government  agricultural  program  should  focus on maintaining  commodity 
reserves  only as a device  for meeting  unforeseen  short-run  fluctuations  in 
supply  and demand.  Thus the Department  of Agriculture  might follow 
directives  such  as those  given  to the Federal  Reserve  Board  and  operate  so 
as to maintain  an orderly  market  for the farm  products. 
INDUSTRIAL  PRICES AND  WAGES 
Unlike  the inflation  problems  in foods, those  in the industrial  sector  do 
not appear  to be susceptible  to simple  solutions.  Extreme  measures  do not 
seem appropriate,  nor do I believe  that a general  wage-price  freeze  is the 
answer  in the current  situation.  A freeze  is useful  as a prelude  to some  other 
policy:  In 1971  it provided  time to set up control  machinery  for Phase  II. 
That machinery  still exists.  Nor is there  a need for a shock treatment  to 
break  anything  loosely defined  as an inflationary  psychology.  The need, 
rather,  is to act before  a renewed  spiral  of wage-price  and  wage-wage  infla- 
tion begins,  rather  than to intervene  once it is under  way.  In addition,  the 
economy is operating  at higher  levels of resource  utilization  and has a 
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nificant  duration  also is quite  inequitable  to labor and disrupts  the collec- 
tive bargaining  process. 
At the other  extreme,  I do not believe  that the government  can respon- 
sibly  simply  wash  its hands  of the whole  mess.  The recognition  that some 
policies  can be inept should not stand as a general  condemnation  of all 
policy.  Government  intervention  in wage and price  decisions  is not desir- 
able,  but for the near  future  it is necessary.  The alternative  of sole reliance 
on fiscal  and monetary  policy proved  ineffective  and costly between  1969 
and 1971  and  I doubt  that  it could  do much  better  today.  In the longer  run 
other  policies  of market  reforms  and  reductions  in the  costs of inflation  and 
unemployment  are  available,  but they  would  be of little  immediate  benefit. 
The most frequently  heard recommendation  is for a simple  return  to 
Phase  II. But  this proposal  must  face  the difficulty  of defining  an equitable 
wage  standard  in view of the substantial  increase  in food prices.  This  diffi- 
culty  illustrates  a basic  problem  of controls:  Food prices  can drive  the rest 
of the program  because  of their  importance  for consumer  prices.  As long as 
they continue  their sharp  upward  trend,  public support  would require  a 
significantly  higher  wage  standard.  But  a wage  standard  of 61/2  to 7 percent 
would  itself be inconsistent  with price  goals in the nonfood  sector. 
The immediate  need is to halt the rises  in industrial  prices  that are not 
justified  by cost increases.  The reluctance  of the designers  of Phase  III to 
maintain  at least  the prenotification  requirement  is difficult  to understand. 
At the minimum  there  is a need  to know of price  increases  and  their  justifi- 
cation.  In place  of an across-the-board  requirement  for prior  approval,  use 
might  have  been  made  of authority  to hold up price  increases  for which  the 
CLC  believes  the justification  may be inadequate.  This would reduce  the 
bureaucratic  tie-ups  with  trivial  price  increases  experienced  during  Phase  II. 
The changes  announced  in May requiring  prior  approval  were  a step in 
the direction  of tighter  controls.  But  their  effectiveness  was severely  limited 
by exempting  price  increases  until those increases  raise average  prices on 
the firm's  sales.  At present,  it is more  important  that the CLC  learn  to say 
"no"  than that it adopt  further  minor  changes  in the regulations.  A strict 
enforcement  of the Phase  II practice  limiting  to 5 1/2  percent  the wage in- 
crease  that can be used for  justifying  price  increases  would  also add some 
needed  restraint. 
Stronger  enforcement  of controls  does  risk  creating  some  distortions  and 
inefficiencies.  But these  costs must  be balanced  against  the costs of further 
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will again  result  if the restraint  must  depend  on fiscal  and  monetary  policy 
alone. 
At the moment,  wage rates  do not appear  to be the primary  problem. 
However,  the current  rate of wage inflation  is subject  to some ambiguity 
arising  from  the data.  The  focus  should  be on preventing  substantial  accel- 
eration  of wage  settlements  in response  to what  may  prove  to be temporary 
food price  increases.  But the 5.5 percent  general  wage standard  may be 
difficult  to enforce.  It may need some modification  to allow for escalator 
clauses or some other partial  adjustment  for food price increases.  This 
allowable  adjustment  might be averaged  over several  years or limited  to 
low-wage  industries. 
STABILIZATION  POLICY 
In an earlier  section  we argued  that capacity  pressures  were of serious 
concern  in only a few sectors  of the economy.  But rates  of real growth  in 
gross  national  product  in excess  of 8 percent  must  arouse  some  concern  that 
fiscal and monetary  policy is overly  expansionary.  The aggregate  unem- 
ployment  rate  has declined  to 5 percent  and  should  drop  further  in the next 
few months.  A gradual  slowing  of real output  growth  to the economy's 
long-run  growth  rate  by year-end  would  certainly  be desirable.  The major 
issue will be whether  currently  planned  shifts in policy are adequate  to 
achieve  this goal. 
Monetary  policy  appears  already  to have shifted  substantially  in the di- 
rection of restraint.  Market  interest  rates have risen to a level that has 
sharply  reduced  the deposit  inflows  of the mortgage  lending  institutions,  a 
development  that will lead to lower  rates  of homebuilding  in future  quar- 
ters. 
If Congress  holds  total budget  expenditures  to the $268.7  billion  recom- 
mended  by the President  for fiscal  year 1974,  fiscal  restraint  will tighten  in 
the rest of 1973  and early  1974.  The increase  in the social  security  tax will 
have some  impact  and expenditures  are projected  to rise by only $2.5 bil- 
lion in the last half of 1973,  following  a $15 billion  increase  in the first  six 
months.  Most of the current  forecasts  seem  to imply  that  these  policies  will 
be sufficient  to slow  the rate  of growth  in real  gross  national  product  to its 
sustainable  trend  rate  by year-end. 